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Abstract
If there is a means tested basic income for old age, households will tend to
reduce precautionary savings to an inefficiently low level. This might serve as a
justification for a public pension system. In a representative agent framework,
indeed, the introduction of a compulsory pension system is shown to be Pareto
improving. This analysis is extended to two income types where compulsory
savings are found to be Pareto improving only up to a point. Increases in
contribution rates beyond that point simply result in increasingly regressive
(implicit) taxation, potentially eliminating all redistribution via the means tested
basic income. Using these results in a pay-as-you-go framework, we show that
an unfunded pensions system (with intragenerational fairness) plays a role
similar to compulsory savings in preventing the savings moral hazard and could
have the same adverse effects on redistribution if it is too large. If the population
is aging, however, an unfunded system with a constant contribution rate is found
to become less effective at preventing the savings moral hazard. In this case,
the introduction of a funded system of the right size is needed to restore Pareto
efficiency.
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As economists we are generally prepared to give consumers the benefit of the doubt that they
know their preferred life time consumption pattern best. Public pension systems, however,
constrain consumers in their choice of consumption pattern. This leads to a potential loss in
welfare. Indeed, from much of the literature on pensions, it would appear that having no
public pension system at all would be as good as or in many cases even better than, having a
pension system
1.
One important justification for compulsory pension systems is given by Friedrich von
Hayek, who should be above any suspicion of having an unfair bias in favor of compulsory
schemes
2:
"Once it becomes the recognized duty of the public to provide for the extreme needs of
old age, unemployment, sickness, etc., irrespective of whether the individuals could
and ought to have made provision themselves, and particularly once help is assured to
such an extent that it is apt to reduce individuals' efforts, it seems an obvious corollary
to compel them to insure (or otherwise provide) against those common hazards of life"
Lindbeck and Weibull [1988] advance a similar argument in a two-stage game with two
altruistic agents who consume during two periods and can make transfers to one another after
their first period consumption. If agents can, at the second stage of the game, revise their first
stage decision about transfers after having observed each other's first period consumption, the
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of this game may be inefficient because of the savings
moral hazard. Under certain circumstances agents have an incentive to save too little because
they can rely on the transfer of the other agent in their old age. Ex-ante commitment to a
certain savings level, for example in the form of compulsory pensions, might solve this
problem
3. In their extensive list of possible explanations for public pensions, Mulligan and
Sala-i-Martin [1999] classify this type of consideration as the "Rational Prodigality"
argument
4.
The aim of this paper is to explore this argument further for both funded and unfunded
pensions systems. In order to reduce complexity, we take the recognized duty of the public to
provide for the "extreme needs of old age" in the form of minimum basic income as given.
                                                
1 Examples here are range from public choice papers like Browning [1975] and Sjoblom [1985 ] to efficient
pension transition literature such as Breyer [1989], Homburg [1990], Feldstein [1995] and Kotlikoff et. al.
[1998].
2 Hayek [1960], p. 286.
3 In an overlapping generations framework with bi-directional altruism across generations, Laitner [1988]
advances in addition the idea of excessive risk taking due to the savings moral hazard.
4 As opposed to "Myopic Prodigality" used in Feldstein [1985] where agents simply lack foresight.3
This is plausible to the extent that minimum basic income for old age is a common
feature of the welfare state in all EU member states and very widespread among industrialized
countries worldwide.
As a starting point, the second section spells out the rational prodigality argument in a
simple public finance setting to explicitly establish the Pareto-improving effect of a funded
pension system where there is means tested basic income. In this simple setting, arbitrarily
high pension contribution rates will fare just as well as the minimum contribution rate needed
to eliminate the savings moral hazard.
The paper then goes on to address both the efficiency and equity effects of a funded
pension systems in a model with two income types. Specifically, in the third section, we
introduce two income types into this model, rich and poor. We start our analysis from a
situation where the pension system is small and both individuals claim means tested basic
income in old age. As the size of the pension system is increased, a critical contribution rate is
reached where rich ceases to claim minimum income and becomes self-reliant. We show that
the tax rate for both individuals can be decreased at this point while keeping government net
revenues constant. This implies a clear-cut Pareto improvement. Further increases beyond this
critical contribution rate result in a lower effective tax rate for rich and in a higher effective
tax rate for poor. Hence, the redistribution from rich to poor via the means tested basic
income is reduced, leaving the poor worse off and the rich increasingly better off. This main
result is surprising to the extent that equity advocates in practice often fight to keep pension
levels high even in countries like Germany where the pension system is intergenerationally
fair
5. Our result establishes that doing this might in fact act against the interest of the poor.
6
The fourth section translates our result from a funded pensions system into a pay-as-
you-go pension system using the equivalence result of Fenge [1995]. Here we show that
lowering pension levels in order to stabilize the pay-as-you-go contribution rate with an aging
population is highly problematic. In particular, we prove that a pay-as-you-go pension system
with a constant contribution rate absorbs aging shocks inefficiently. Adding a funded pension
system of the right size will help to restore Pareto efficiency.
In the conclusion we discuss some policy implications of our findings and make some
suggestions for further research.
                                                
5 Intergenerational fairness means that within each generation pensions are calculated as a fixed proportion of
personal contributions. This implies that the pension system does not redistribute within any given generation,
although it might well redistribute across generations.
6 Or at least against that part of the poor population which is young. Poor old age pensioners will of course
generally appreciate any effort directed against lower pensions.4
2. The Representative Agent Model
The model assumes a representative agent with a utility function  ) , ( o y C C U  with the usual
assumptions of strict quasi-concavity and positive first partial derivatives.  y C  and  o C  stand
for consumption in youth and old age respectively. When he is young the agent supplies his
labor inelastically and is paid a total wage of W. For notational convenience the price of the
consumption good is normalized to unity and the interest rate is set to zero.
The state provides a means tested basic income m in old age. If the sum of voluntary
savings and compulsory savings due to the pension system of the representative agent at the
end of the working period is below m, the state provides income support to prop up the total
second period consumption to m. In order to finance the means tested income and other state
expenditure, the state collects income tax at rate t.
In addition, the state sets the contribution rate b to a funded pension system with
individual accounts. This contribution rate b can be interpreted as the compulsory savings rate
in the context of this model.
Furthermore, the representative agent has access to a perfect credit market. In
particular, the agent can sell his pension claims to a bank when he is young. The only
restriction on this is imposed by the protected earnings rate (up to which an amount is exempt
from seizure) set at the level of the means tested basic income which is a common feature of
the welfare state in many countries. Banks are simply not allowed to strip their debtors of the
bare essentials they need to live. As a consequence, banks will not accept as collateral that
part of compulsory savings which will have to be used to cover the bare essentials in old age.
In other words, only pension claims above the basic income can be sold by the agent.
The nature of the budget constraint the representative agent faces is depicted in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Budget constraint of the representative agent5
The dotted line in each diagram illustrates the budget constraint with without taxes, basic
income or forced savings. The tax t shifts the budget constraint inwards as illustrated. The
minimum basic income sets the minimum second period consumption level at m. And the
contribution rate b reduces the maximum first period consumption from  ) 1 ( t W −  to
) 1 ( b t W − −  as illustrated in the left diagram. However, if  W m b / > , the future pension claim
in excess of the basic income m could be used as a collateral and could therefore be consumed
already in youth. Therefore, the maximum first period consumption in this case is simply
m t W − − ) 1 ( , as illustrated in the right diagram. As can be seen in the left diagram, the budget
set of the representative agent may be non-convex. As a consequence, two separate
maximization problems of the representative agent need to be examined:
Case 1: When the agent lives on the basic income in old age, indirect utility is given by
m C
b t W C








) 1 ( s.t.




It should be noted that, for contribution rates  W m b / ≥ , the representative agent cannot
reasonably claim income support, since the compulsory savings are above the level m and
negative private savings are restricted by the legal distraint limit in such a way that the sum of
private and compulsory savings cannot drop below m. But for the sake of notational
completeness which will make the proofs easier, we extend the definition as follows to
include all W m b / ≥ :
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Case 2: When the agent does not live on the basic income in old age, indirect utility is given
by6
m t W C
t W C C
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The indirect utility function of the representative agent can now be defined as
) , max( ) , , , ( 2 1 V V b t m W V = .( 4 )
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Note that we assume that the basic income will not be claimed if the maximum utility when
claiming the basic income is equal to the maximum utility when not claiming the basic
income.
Having established the basic notation we now look for possible reform policies that
involve changes in the tax rate and the contribution rates without making future generations
worse off from increased public debt and we find
Proposition 1a: An increase in the contribution rate to the funded pension system is never
welfare decreasing.
The proof is given in Appendix I. To give an intuition for the result, we examine the three
principal cases verbally.
Case 1: The initial contribution rate is already so high that the agent does not claim the basic
income in the first place. Further increases in the contribution rate will not change the
consumption pattern because the increased compulsory savings can be offset by borrowing,
using the increased compulsory savings as collateral. To keep net state revenues constant, the
tax rate is left unchanged.
Case 2: The agent claims the basic income at the initial contribution rate, but, as the
contribution rate is increased, the agent stops claiming the basic income. Keeping net7
revenues of the state constant, the tax can now be lowered by the very amount previously used
to finance the basic income. The present value of the agent's consumption is thus the same as
it was when the basic income was claimed but is no longer conditional on a second period
consumption at the level of the basic income m. The agent's utility therefore either stays the
same or increases.
Case 3: The agent claims the basic income at the initial contribution rate and continues to do
so with the increased contribution rate. In this case, the tax rate can be lowered so as to keep
the sum of contribution rate and tax rate constant. The utility of the agent is not altered by this
type of reform since contributions are perceived as income tax by the agent. And net revenues
of the state do not change either, since the increased pensions due to increased contributions
make the basic income that much cheaper: the difference between pensions and the basic
income that needs to be tax financed diminishes by exactly the right amount.
Having established that it is never welfare decreasing to raise compulsory savings b, one
important question remains: under what circumstances will an increase in b result in a clear-
cut Pareto-improvement? This question is answered by
Proposition 1b: If the means tested basic income induces the representative agent to save too
little, the first best utility can always be reached by increasing the contribution rate while
keeping net revenues of the state constant.
Proof: The first best utility without the basic income while keeping the net revenues of the
state constant can be written as  ) 0 , , 0 , ( 0 t W V  where  W t b B t / ) , ( 0 ∆ = . "The agent saves too
little" implies that the basic income 
*
2 C m <  where 
*
2 C is the first best second period
consumption level. Hence  ) 0 , , 0 , ( ) , , , ( ) , , , ( 0 1 t W V b t m W V b t m W V < = . Furthermore, by
inspection we have  ) / , , , ( ) 0 , , 0 , ( 0 0 W m t m W V t W V = . Therefore, if we set  b W m b > = / '  and
0 ' t t =  it follows that  ) ' , ' , , ( ) 0 , , 0 , ( ) , , , ( 0 b t m W V t W V b t m W V = < . 
With Proposition 1b we conclude that compulsory savings are a complete cure for the savings
moral hazard problem if the agent is induced to save too little. Since the basic income is
usually set at a level which is unreasonably low for the majority of the population in a first8
best situation, there is reason to believe that the introduction of a compulsory funded pension
system will be welfare improving.
In the case of one representative agent, a more direct solution to the problem would be
to do away with the basic income altogether. Indeed, if everybody earns the same wage,
redistribution via a means tested basic income makes little sense. Therefore, we extend the
model to two types of agents, rich and poor.
3. Extension to Two Types: Rich and Poor
This extension assumes two representative agents, rich and poor, each with the same utility
function ) , ( o y C C U , only this time homothetic
7. Both agents supply their labor inelastically.
Rich is paid a total wage of  R W . Poor is paid a total wage of  R P W W < . The fraction of rich
people in the total population is denoted byα . The fraction of poor people in the population is
denoted by  α − 1 .
As before, the state provides a means tested basic income m in old age. In order to
finance the means tested income and other state expenditure, the state collects income tax at
rate t. In addition, the state sets the uniform contribution rate b for a funded pension system
with individual accounts. b can again be interpreted as the compulsory savings rate.
Both agents have access to a perfect credit market. In particular, the agents can sell
their pension claims to the bank when young. Again, the only restriction to this is the
protected earnings rate set at the level of means tested basic income.
As illustrated in the preceding section, the maximization problem of each agent
generally has a non-convex budget constraint. Using the notation of the last section, the
indirect utility of rich is defined as  ) , , , ( b t m W V R , the indirect utility of poor is  ) , , , ( b t m W V P .
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If both individuals claim the basic income in old age, their contribution b is a pure tax because
the benefit they receive in retirement is independent of what they contribute. Hence, the net
revenues of the state are the contributions to the funded system and the income tax minus the9
basic income paid to both poor and rich. If only poor claims the basic income and rich relies
exclusively on compulsory and voluntary savings, the net state revenues are the contribution
payments and the income tax of poor and only the income tax of rich minus the basic income
for poor. And if neither poor nor rich claim the basic income, the income tax revenues equal
the net revenues of the state.
Lemma A in the Appendix II shows it can never be the case that rich claims the basic
income and poor does not. In order to make the point at which rich and poor stop claiming the
basic income clearer, we introduce the following two definitions:
Definition 1: The smallest contribution rate for which there exists a tax rate t such that
) , , , ( ) , , , ( 2 1 b t m W V b t m W V R R =  and  ) , (
* b t B B ∆ = ∆  is called 
* b .
* b  is the threshold contribution rate for rich. If the tax rate is adjusted reasonably by the state,
for any contribution rate 
* b b ≥  rich will not claim the basic income.
Definition 2: The smallest compulsory savings rate for which there exists a tax rate t such that
) , , , ( ) , , , ( 2 1 b t m W V b t m W V P P =  and  ) , (
* * b t B B ∆ = ∆  is called 
* * b .
As Lemma B in the Appendix II shows, the threshold contribution rate 
* * b  (where poor is
indifferent between self-reliance and claiming the basic income in old age) is strictly greater
than the threshold b* for rich. For a given contribution rate, rich is forced to save a higher
amount than poor. Therefore, rich will already rely exclusively on his own savings at
contribution rates where poor still claims the basic income. Lemma C in the Appendix II
shows that, for any contribution rate above the respective threshold values, neither of the
agents will start claiming the basic income again. Under the assumption that the basic income
is set at such a low level that rich saves too little at b=0 as compared to the first best, we can
describe the effects of increases in b as follows: first, rich stops claiming the basic income at
* b b =  and then poor stops claiming the basic income at 
* * b b = .
Furthermore, given any compulsory savings rate b  (0<b<1) and tax rate t where
) , , , ( b t m W V R  and  ) , , , ( b t m W V P  are well defined we deduce
                                                                                                                                                        
7 More generally, the following propositions hold if the first best income expansion path is either a straight line
(homothetic utility) or bent towards second period consumption. This is the plausible assumption that rich10
Proposition 2: For reform policies that increase the contribution rate b and adjust the tax rate
t in order to keep net revenues constant, the following statements hold:
(i) Below the critical contribution rate 
* b , contribution rate increases allow the state to reduce
the tax rate one to one. Such changes are Pareto indifferent, since the utility of neither rich nor
poor changes.
(ii) An increase of the contribution rate to the critical rate 
* b  allows the state to reduce the tax
by more than the contribution rate was increased. Such changes are strictly Pareto improving
since the utility of both rich and poor increases.
(iii) Further increases from b* to a contribution rate between 
* b  and 
* * b  allow the state to
reduce the tax rate by less than the increase in the contribution rate. Such changes are Pareto
incomparable, since the utility of rich increases, whereas the utility of poor decreases. They
simply reduce the redistribution from rich to poor via means tested basic income.
(iv) Increases of the contribution rate to and beyond 
* * b  eliminate all redistribution via means
tested basic income.















α − + α
α −




]] 1 for 0 , b b
db
dt ** ∈ = (8)
Propostion 2(i) follows from (6). Proposition 2(iii) follows from (7). Proposition 2(iv) follows
from (8). To prove Proposition 2(ii), we investigate how t behaves at the critical value 
* b .
For 
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attaches, in relative terms, more importance to future consumption than poor.11

















*  by assumption as rich saves too little compared to
first best at  0 = b , it follows that  t t > , so the tax indeed drops vertically at 
* b . Hence
Proposition 2(ii) holds. €
Closer investigation of the proof shows that there are small ranges of b above both b*and b**
where there are two possible tax rates that satisfy the state budget contraint.
8 The higher tax
rate is inefficient in the Laffer sense. The proof of Proposition 2 describes the nature of the
trade-off between the compulsory savings rate b and the tax rate t exhaustively, as depicted in
Figure 2.
Figure 2: The trade-off between tax rate and compulsory savings rate
For contribution rates ranging from 0 to 
* b , the tax rate t which satisfies the state budget
restriction falls one to one as b increases: any increase in b helps to finance the basic income.
At 
* b  the tax rate drops vertically, since rich no longer claims the basic income, thus reducing
government expenditure. Between 
* b  and 
* * b  the tax rate decreases with a slope of absolute
value smaller than 1, since only the increased contributions by poor help to finance the basic
income. Increased contributions by rich no longer have this effect, since rich no longer claims
                                                
8  t t >  in the above proof implies that somewhat above the critical contribution rates the agents can still be
made to claim the basic income with an inappropriately high tax rate.12
the basic income in the first place. From 
* * b  onwards the tax rate no longer varies with the
contribution rate since higher contributions have no impact on state expenditure.
As discussed above, for certain values of b, there are two possible tax rates as
indicated by the gray segments, in addition to the black line, that guarantee government net
revenues  B ∆ . Moving from the higher to the lower tax rate is Pareto improving just as
moving from one side of a Laffer curve to the other is Pareto improving. However, if the
government were to mistakenly equate its efforts to achieve social justice with social justice
itself, there would be a real danger of choosing the inefficient rather than the efficient tax rate
for a given compulsory savings rate b because the "social" expenditure for the basic income is
bigger for the inefficiently high tax rate.
For any 
* b b < , both representative agents view their compulsory savings as an
additional implicit tax, since additional compulsory savings do not result in additional
consumption in old age. For any b between 
* b  and 
* * b , rich does not view the compulsory
savings as an implicit tax, since additional compulsory savings will result in additional old
age income. Poor, however, still views compulsory savings as a tax, since additional
compulsory still will not result in higher old age income. For 
* * b b > , neither of the agents
views b as an implicit tax. Taking these considerations into account, Figure 3 shows the
variations of the effective marginal tax rates for rich and poor as b is increased. In addition,
the effective level of redistribution from rich to poor via means tested basic income as b is
increased is depicted.
Figure 3: Variation of the effective marginal tax rate and the redistribution with an increasing
compulsory savings rate b.13
Raising the contribution rate from any 
* b b <  to 
* b b =  results in a Pareto improvement. The
redistribution
9 is actually increased. Increasing the contribution rate from 
* b  any further is
generally not Pareto improving. Rich becomes increasingly better off whereas poor loses out.
If b is increased to 
* * b , any redistribution from rich to poor is eliminated. Further increases of
b have no real effect. Figure 4 illustrates the regressive effects of contribution rate increases
above 
* b :
Figure 4: If contribution rate b is increased from b* on the utility of the rich is increased and
the utility of the poor is decreased.
The bold lines show the budget sets of rich and poor if b is slightly above the critical value
* b . Rich lives in old age from his savings, so his indifference curve is tangent to the upper
left segment of his budget constraint. Poor consumes the basic income in old age. His
indifference curve touches the corner of his budget set. The bold arrows indicate how the
budget sets shift if b is increased further. Rich continues not to claim the basic income and
receives his savings in old age. Poor continues to rely on the basic income and loses his
                                                
9 We measure redistribution by the percentage of gross wage income consumed by poor compared to the


















, normalizing redistribution to zero for
proportional taxation in the absence of publicly provided goods. The increase in redistribution at 
* b is due to the
fact that rich all of a sudden no longer gets the basic income and this increases redistribution. The resulting tax
cut in turn benefits both rich and poor by the same proportion, so redistribution is altogether increased.14
increased contribution payments. In order to keep the state budget constant, the tax rate will
be decreased by less than the contribution rate is increased. Thus, rich benefits from an
increase in net income due to a declining tax rate whereas poor suffers from an increase in his
effective overall tax rate which is the sum of the contribution rate b and the implicit tax rate t.
In this section we have shown how crucial the contribution rate b really is. If b is
smaller than 
* b , then the whole system is inefficient. If b is larger than 
* b , then further
increases in b will result in redistribution from poor to rich. This result is counter intuitive to
the extent that, traditionally, the efficiency advocates have called for a small compulsory
pensions system hoping for small government, whereas the equity advocates have called for
large compulsory pension system in the name of social justice. Our results challenge this
view. Efficiency advocates not interested in social justice should be quite happy to call for
high contribution rates even above 
* * b  whereas equity advocates should promote a small
contribution rate 
* b
The next section explains why these results are particularly relevant in a pay-as-you-
go pension system faced with an aging crisis.
4. Pay-as-you-go pension system
In a model with labor-leisure distortion, Fenge (1995) has shown that the transition from a
pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension system with intragenerational fairness to a fully funded
system cannot be Pareto-improving. However, in our present model with a savings distortion
due to means tested basic income things are somewhat different. Even though an
intragenerationally fair PAYG pension system with a sufficiently high effective contribution
rate is, in principle, able to eliminate the moral hazard savings problem, in times when the
population in most countries with a PAYG system is aging, the effective implied savings rate
may become too low to do so.
To derive this result, we write the individual maximization problem in an economy
with a PAYG pension system and a means tested basic income as:
p s C
W s C t s
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θ δ (9)15
where δ  is the contribution rate to the PAYG system, θ  is the explicit income tax rate, and s
denotes the voluntary savings. The pension p in the PAYG pension system with
intragenerational fairness is given by:
W p ⋅ ⋅ Ω = δ (10)
where Ω  denotes one plus the implicit rate of return to the PAYG which is equal to the growth
rate of wage income
10. The contribution to the PAYG system may be split into a part that
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The first term on the right side gives the part that pays the capital market interest. The
effective contribution rate is denoted by b. The second term on the right side is the part that is
seen as an implicit tax where the implicit tax rate is denoted by τ
12. The lifetime budget
restriction results from equation (9), (10) and (11):
) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( τ θ
τ
δ θ δ θ δ − − = Ω − − − = Ω + − − = + W W W W W C C o y " # "$ %
By denoting the sum of the implicit tax rate τ  and the explicit tax rate θ  as t, we re-establish
the notation of preceding sections. When the individual decides to live on the basic income in
old age, the indirect utility is given by:
m C
b t W C
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+ where Nt is the working population in period t and Wt their wage.
11 See Homburg/Richter (1989)
12 Strictly speaking, in an efficient world with zero interest rate,  1 < Ω  and  0 < τ  which would leave us in an
Aaron [1966] world. However, we need not worry since zero interest was only assumed for simplification. All
results we rely on in this section carry through for a strictly positive interest rate as well.16
When the individual decides not to live on the basic income, the indirect utility is
given by:
m t W C
t W C C t s
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(13)
The formal equivalence of the funded and PAYG pension system shows that PAYG pensions
systems can, in principle, fight the savings moral hazard just as well as a funded system. In
particular, in an economy where the wage W and the basic income m stay constant over time
and the population has constant average age or rejuvenates (which corresponds to a constant
or accelerating population growth rate), the effective contribution rate b will also stay
constant or will increase. If b is sufficiently high to begin with, the whole economy will
therefore be in an eternally efficient state. A Pareto improving transition to a funded system
would not be possible in this case.
Next we consider an economy which faces a demographic crisis due to an aging
population. If the reaction to this crisis is to keep PAYG contribution rate constant, we can
write:
δ δ = (14)
Assuming the wage W to be constant across generations, an aging population implies a
decrease in Ω . In order to avoid intergenerational redistribution, we keep the net revenues of
the state constant. As a consequence we obtain
Proposition 3a: If population ages, the policy of a fixed contribution rate in a PAYG-system
tends to induce contributors to save too little and to claim the means tested basic income.
Proof:
If the population ages (Ω  decreases), the effective contribution rate b decreases to  ' b . This can
be seen from equation (11). If we write  b b b ∆ − = ' , the implicit tax rate t increases to
t t t ∆ + = ' , where:17
0 = ∆ + ∆ t b . (15)
Consider now an effective contribution rate b<m/W. We want to prove:
) ' , ' , , ( ) ' , ' , , ( ) , , , ( ) , , , ( 2 1 2 1 b t m W V b t m W V b t m W V b t m W V > ⇒ ≥ (16)
Since  ' ' b t b t + = + :
). , , , ( ) ' , ' , , ( 1 1 b t m W V b t m W V = (17)
Since V2(·) decreases with an increasing tax rate t and does not depend on the compulsory
savings rate b we deduce that
) ' , ' , , ( ) , , , ( 2 2 b t m W V b t m W V > (18)
Equation (17) and (18) yield the implication in (16). In particular we have shown that:
) ' , ' , , ( ) ' , ' , , ( ) , , , ( ) , , , ( 2 1 2 1 b t m W V b t m W V b t m W V b t m W V > ⇒ = (19)
Hence, if the nominal contribution rate δ  is fixed, a decreasing population tends to induce a
higher demand for means tested basic income in old age. 
If the population ages and consequently the implicit tax τ  in the PAYG system increases by
too much, individuals will refuse to save out of their diminishing net income and decide to
live on the means tested basic income in old age. For a country with a constant contribution
rate, an aging population poses a real danger to the efficiency of the welfare state since the
pension system may no longer be effective in fighting the savings moral hazard.
Proposition 3b: Adding a funded pension system of the right size to the PAYG in times of
aging population will restore Pareto efficiency. If the funded system exceeds a critical size,
the initial Pareto improvement turns into a pure redistribution from poor to rich.18
Proof: For one representative agent, Proposition 1 shows that the moral hazard savings
problem can be eliminated by the introduction of a fully funded pension. Even increases
above the threshold rate will have the desired effect. According to Proposition 2 (ii), the
inefficiency of an aging shock in the described pension system will disappear if an additional
fully funded pension system is introduced, so that the total effective contribution rate equals
* b . Proposition 2 (iii) now tells us, that, if the contribution rate of the funded system is
increased from 
* b  to even higher effective contribution rates, pure redistribution from poor to
rich will result. 
Thus, a government set upon a constant contribution rate the the PAYG system and faced
with an aging population can restore efficiency by introducing a supplementary funded
system. However, the government should be careful to choose the right size for the
supplementary funded system. If it is too small, the savings moral hazard of the rich will not
be cured. If it is too big, it will simply have an regressive effect by reducing redistribution
from rich to poor via the means tested basic income.
Those results can readily applied to current policy debate about pension reform in
Germany. The Wissenschaftliche Beirat [1998], for example, recommends a policy of keeping
the sum of the contribution rates to the PAYG system and to the additional funded system
constant. According to our analysis it would be preferable to keep the effective contribution
rate constant instead.
5. Conclusion
If a government employs the means tested basic income as a redistribution device, then it is
generally Pareto-improving to additionally install a compulsory funded pension system.
Having established this result as a starting point, we find that the size of this compulsory
funded system as given by its contribution rate is important. It should be sufficiently high to
insure that average citizens will not start claiming the basic income in old age. On the other
hand it should be sufficiently small so that the means tested basic income still results in
redistribution from rich to poor. To some extent this challenges conventional wisdom that
equity advocates should argue for bigger pension systems whereas efficiency advocates
should argue for smaller pension systems.
By translating these results into the framework of pay-as-you-go pension systems, we
are able to draw important conclusions for the current pension debate in Europe. Europe is
faced with a serious aging crisis and most European countries have pay-as-you-go pension19
systems that run into severe financial difficulties as a consequence. One popular belief is that,
as a reaction to this crisis, old age pensions should be decreased so as to ensure that
contributions for the working population stay constant over time. We show that this policy
option is highly problematic. When the general pension level falls below the level of the basic
income, there is a real danger of savings moral hazard causing serious inefficiencies. Under
these circumstances, the introduction of an additional funded system of the right size is
needed in order to restore Pareto efficiency.
More generally, the number of old age pensioners claiming the basic income could be
used as an important indicator of whether the pension system has had the right size in the past.
In Germany, for example, currently less than 4 percent of the population aged 60 and over
claim basic income support. This might indicate that the German pension system has been
somewhat oversized during the past decades at the expense of redistribution. Therefore, there
might be some room for moderate pension cuts. However, the German government has to be
careful not to cut pensions by too much: if it does, Germany might end up in a situation where
the resulting decrease in pension contribution rates is more than offset by the increasing
financing needs for the means tested basic income.
For future research we suggest introducing the labor-leisure distortion and two
working periods into our model. First, this would make it possible to analyze the trade-off
between Beveridge and Bismarck pensions
13 when fighting the savings moral hazard and
labor-leisure distortions at the same time. Second, new light could be shed on the problem of
selling future pension claims. Although even very high compulsory savings might not
adversely affect total working life consumption, they distort the consumption during working
life.
                                                
13 Cremer and Pestieau [1998] coined these terms to denote flat and contribution related benefits respectively.20
Appendix I
Proof for Proposition 1a: Three situations need to be treated separately where  b b > '  is the
increased contribution rate to be examined.
A. We examine the situation where, even prior to reform, the representative agent did not rely
on state support:  ) , , , ( ) , , , ( 2 1 b t m W V b t m W V ≤ . It follows by inspection that, for any
contribution rate  b b > '  and an unaltered tax rate  t t = ' , the indirect utility doesn't change
) ' , ' , , ( ) , , , ( b t m W V b t m W V =  and the net revenues of the state do not change
) ' , ' ( ) , ( b t B b t B ∆ = ∆ .
B. Alternatively, we might be in the situation where, prior to reform, the representative agent
did rely on state support
) , , , ( ) , , , ( 2 1 b t m W V b t m W V > (20)
From the comments about equation (1) it is clear that  W m b / ≤ .
B1. If we are in a situation where
) ' , / , , ( ) ' , / , , ( 2 1 b W m b t m W V b W m b t m W V − + ≤ − + , (21)
we chose the tax rate  W m b t t / ' − + = . Because  W m b b / '≤ <  we deduce  t t ≤ '  and
b t b t + ≤ + ' ' . Therefore  ) , , , ( ) ' , ' , , ( 1 1 b t m W V b t m W V ≥ . Using (20) and (21) we
deduce ) ' , ' , , ( ) , , , ( b t m W V b t m W V ≤ . It also follows that
) , ( ) ( ' ) ' , ' ( b t B m W b t W t b t B ∆ = − + = = ∆ .
B2. For all the remaining cases (20) and the following inequality holds:
) ' , / , , ( ) ' , / , , ( 2 1 b W m b t m W V b W m b t m W V − + > − + . (22)
We chose a tax rate  b b t t + − = ' ' . By inspection it follows that  ) ' , ' , , ( ) , , , ( 1 1 b t m W V b t m W V = . If
) ' , ' , , ( ) ' , ' , , ( 2 1 b t m W V b t m W V >  it follows directly that  ) ' , ' , , ( ) , , , ( b t m W V b t m W V =  and that
) , ( ' ) ' ( ) ' , ' ( b t B m bW tW m W b W b b t b t B ∆ = − + = − + + − = ∆ . If  ) ' , ' , , ( ) ' , ' , , ( 2 1 b t m W V b t m W V ≤ ,21
it follows that  ) ' , ' , , ( ) , , , ( b t m W V b t m W V ≤  and
) , ( ) ( ' ) ( ) ' ( ) ' , ' ( b t B m W b t W b W b t W b b t b t B ∆ = − + ≥ − + = + − = ∆  since  W m b / '≤ because
of (22).
Appendix II
Lemma A: If rich claims the basic income, poor will as well. Equivalently, if poor does not
claim the basic income, neither will rich.
Proof: If rich claims the basic income,  ) , , , ( ) , , , ( 2 1 b t m W V b t m W V R R > . Because of homothetic
utility it follows that  ) , , , ( ) , , , ( 2 1 b t m
W
W









P > . But  1 V  strictly increases whereas
2 V  weakly decreases as m increases. Hence
) , , , ( ) , , , ( ) , , , ( ) , , , ( 2 2 1 1 b t m W V b t m
W
W
W V b t m
W
W






P P ≥ > > . Poor will therefore
claim the basic income as well. 22
Lemma B: 
* * * b b <
Proof: From Lemma A it is clear that 
* * * b b ≤ . Assuming 
* b b = , by definition
) , , , ( ) , , , ( 2 1 b t m W V b t m W V R R = . Using homothetic utility, it follows that
) , , , ( ) , , , ( 2 1 b t m
W
W









P = . But  1 V  strictly increases with m whereas  2 V  weakly
decreases. Hence  ) , , , ( ) , , , ( ) , , , ( ) , , , ( 2 2 1 1 b t m W V b t m
W
W
W V b t m
W
W






P P ≥ = > . This
contradicts 
* * b b = , where  ) , , , ( ) , , , ( 2 1 b t m W V b t m W V P P =  by definition. Therefore 
* * * b b ≠ . 
Lemma C: If an agent does not claim the basic income for b, he will not claim the basic
income for any  b b > ' .
Proof: If  ) , , , ( ) , , , ( 1 2 b t m W V b t m W V ≥  and the government budget is kept at  B ∆ , for any
b b > '  the corresponding  t t ≤ ' . Hence, by inspection,  ) ' , ' , , ( ) , , , ( 2 2 b t m W V b t m W V ≤  and
) , , , ( ) ' , ' , , ( 1 1 b t m W V b t m W V < . Therefore it follows that  ) ' , ' , , ( ) ' , ' , , ( 1 2 b t m W V b t m W V ≥ .
The above Lemmas establish that, if for  0 = b  both agent claim the basic income and rich
saves too little, when b is increased, first rich stops claiming the basic income at 
* b b =  and
then poor stops claiming the basic income at 
* * b b = .23
References
AARON, H. [1966], "The Social Insurance Paradox", Canadian Journal of Economics and
Political Science 32, 371-374.
BREYER, F. [1989], "On the intergenerational Pareto efficiency of pay-as-you-go financed
pension", Journal of institutional and theoretical economics 145, 643-658.
BROWNING, E.K. [1975], "Why the Social Insurance Budget is Too Large in a Democracy",
Economic Inquiry 13(3), 373-388.
CREMER, H. and P. PESTIEAU [1998], "Social insurance, majority voting and labor mobility",
Journal of Public Economics 68, 397-420.
FELDSTEIN, M. [1985], "The Optimal Level of Social Security Benefits", Quarterly Journal
of Economics 10(2), 303-320.
FELDSTEIN, M. [1995], "Would Privatizing Social Security Raise Economic Welfare?",
NBER Working Paper No. W5281.
FENGE, R. [1995], "Pareto-efficiency of the Pay-as-you-go Pension System with
Intragenerational Fairness", Finanzarchiv, N.F. 52, 357-363.
HAYEK, F. A. von [1960], The Constitution of Liberty,  Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
HOMBURG, S. [1990], “The efficiency of unfunded pension schemes”, Journal of institutional
and theoretical economics 146, 640-647.
HOMBURG, S. and W.F. RICHTER [1989], “Eine effizienzorientierte Reform der GRV”, in: B.
Felderer(ed.) Bevölkerung und Wirtschaft, 183-191, Berlin: Duncker&Humblot.
KOTLIFKOFF, L.J., K.A. SMETTERS, and J. WALLISER [1998], "Opting out of Social Security
and Adverse Selection", NBER Working Paper No. W6430.
LAITNER, J. [1988], "Bequests, Gifts, and Social Security", Review of Economic Studies, 55,
275-299.
LINDBECK, A. and WEIBULL, J.W. [1988], "Altruism and Time Consistency: The Economics
of Fait Accompli", Journal of Political Economy, 96, 1165-1182.
MULLIGAN, C.B. and X. SALA-I-MARTIN [1999], "Social Security in Theory and Practice (II):
Efficiency Theories, Narrative Theories, and Implications for Reform", NBER Working
Paper No. W7119
SJOBLOM, K. [1985], "Voting for Social Security", Public Choice 45, 225-240.
WISSENSCHAFTLICHE  BEIRAT BEIM BUNDESMINISTERIUM FÜR WIRTSCHAFT (1998),
Grundlegende Reform der Gesetzlichen Rentenversicherung, Bundesministerium für
Wirtschaft, Bonn.